 |
 |
 |
||||||||
|
|
|
||||||||
|
 |
G.C. Berkouwer and John Calvin on The Providence of God
April 29, 1988
for
J.I. Packer,
Regent College
Systematic Theology II
Note: In order to facilitate my interaction with the primary sources, I have limited myself to Berkouwer’s book, and Calvin’s three chapters in The Institutes on Providence (chapters 16-18 of book one). Since each are referred to extensively, I have made references in the body of the text, rather than having formal footnotes. Page numbers refer to Providence of God while chapter section references (e.g. 16:2) refer to Calvin.
G.C. Berkouwer’s book The Providence of God is the one of the most significant contemporary reformed treatment of this undervalued topic. This work has particular value over against earlier systematic theologies in that it draws from historical and philosophical trends of the twentieth century as well as from the great writers of that period, that is Bavinck, Kuyper, Brunner, and Van Til. Berkouwer' s work, being fairly recent (i.e. 1950), is able to analyze the contributions of the mature Barth in a way that is neither uncritical nor overly-critical of this great theologian. Thus, Berkouwer provides an excellent complement to the more seminal writings of his theological ancestor, John Calvin. Granted, Berkouwer’s writing is not as tidy as that of Calvin or the later scholastic theologians. One could wish that Berkouwer did not have the bad habit of making seemingly profound statements and then leaving the reader hanging as to what he means by them. But he is not a systematician, but more of a brooder – a polemical brooder. He raises questions without always answering them in full. This is fitting, for his self-conscious desire is to make his theology one that is rooted in real faith and real life.
Berkouwer is not only modern (or fairly modern) but he is a modern Dutchman, one who has experienced first-hand the stabbing questions which arise from his familiarity with desolation and catastrophe. He wrote his book on Providence surrounded by the numbness, the dread, of post-war Europe. This dread he defined as “the result of man’s being more or less ruthlessly snatched out of an old and trusted order and forced into a strange and. hostile world” (p. 12). This trusted order is the order of Providence, or the belief in Providence, that God who made the world was sustaining it and ruling it according to his good purpose. Thus he writes of Providence at a time in history when it is honestly, if not justifiably, questioned.
The cultural milieu out of which Calvin wrote his theologies was not one untouched by crisis either. Like Berkouwer’s day, Calvin’s too was characterized by changes in the “old order,” persecutions unto death, and personal crises. Even so, these were deaths and crises which arose out of conviction. The persecutions were directed. Even the change was anticipatory, hopeful, even though often drastic. Wars did rage between nations and cities, which no doubt left the inhabitants asking, “Why?” Yet there was nothing comparable to the desolation of Europe during W.W.II.
Berkouwer’s words are certainly true when applied to Calvin:
Many of the treatises give little, if any, attention to crisis phenomena. The doctrine of Providence is discussed usua1ly in general and timeless terms. We receive the impression that a finished definition has been reached (pp. 10-11).
Now this would be less applicable to Calvin than, say, Turretin or Beza. It should not be construed to mean that in Calvin there is not a dynamic devotional element. Therefore, even though Calvin does not write giving conscious attention to crisis phenomena (this is a modern concept), his writing does bear witness to a man who knows the value and relevance of the doctrines about which he writes. And it certainly displays that character of one who desires to honor the God of the Scriptures, to Whom and to Which, he is ever faithful.
Berkouwer and Calvin are both characterized by the desire not to speculate where the Bible does not. In many respects, Berkouwer’s book offers a polemic against speculative theology. A guiding principle seems to be that if the Scripture brings forth teaching which does not seem logically consistent, so be it. This native impulse towards wrapping things up in neat logical packages is not necessarily, in Berkouwer’s mind, part of our redeemed nature.
Berkouwer’s work being substantially longer and four hundred years more recent covers questions and topics not covered by Calvin. Some of these will be analyzed. However, the bulk of this paper will cover issues discussed by both Calvin and Berkouwer. In order, these issues will include the Knowledge of Providence, Providence as Sustenance, Providence as Government, and Theodicy.
Berkouwer lays the foundation for his discussion in a chapter on the Knowledge of Providence. That is, how do we know of the reality of Providence and what is the basis for this knowledge? (p.31). Is this knowledge exclusively the Christian’s, or is it a more general understanding shared by Christian and non-Christian alike?
The latter question is actually addressed by Calvin, and answered in a way that would please Berkouwer. Firstly, Calvin argues forcefully that the doctrine of Providence is not equivalent to beliefs in fortune or fate. These are, he says, pagan terms “… with whose significance the minds of the godly ought not to be occupied” (16:8). Yet, even this concept of fate is evidence that what is set forth in Scripture about God’s Providence has not been completely extinguished from men’s hearts. There are still, says Calvin, “… sparks glowing in the darkness.” The Philistine soothsayers, for example, recognize that either God or chance could be in charge of their fate (I Samuel 6:9). Yet it is divination which is used to determine whether their chastening has come from God or not, and this divination deceives them. Thus, whereas there is a spark of revelation available to them on this matter of Providence, in their sin and blindness it blossoms forth into falsehood and not truth.
In Berkouwer’s view, Providence is not a “mixed article,” that is, one that can be known by natural reason as well as by revelation. What about those ideas which bear close resemblance to the doctrine of Providence? Berkouwer, following Bavinck, attests that this Providence is more theoretical and philosophical than religious. “It continually oscillated between chance and fate,” and did not offer the “well-spring of hope and comfort, trust and courage, humility and con-fidence” (p.37). But is there something about the pagan concepts of Providence which is in fact true if not complete? Is there a common area of thought? Berkouwer says, “no!” “A pre- or non-Christian concept is not an integral part of the full Christian concept, but a mutilation of its truth” (p.41). Berkouwer does not adequately substantiate this, nor does he interact with the “common ground” put forth by Paul in Acts 17:30. For him, non-Christian concepts of Providence, whatever similarities exist with Christian Providence in a formal sense, are nonetheless other than Christian. Quoting Bavinck he writes, “We are not concerned with a general guidance of a ‘god,’ a Higher Being, or a prime mover.” It seems that for Berkouwer, if it does not bring the comfort of the Christian doctrine, if it is not soteriological in nature, it has nothing in common with Christian Providence. There is a believer-centeredness about true Providence, even though it pertains to all men and all things. It is this believer-centeredness which provides that “we may be thankful in prosperity and patient in adversity” (p.33). Calvin also emphasizes the benefits which come to the believer through faith in God’s Providence. These benefits are rooted in God’s promises: “There are very many and very clear promises that testify that God’s singular Providence watches over the welfare of believers” (17:7). Berkouwer notes that the skeptic would attribute such a doctrine to the invention of man who needs such a doctrine. To Berkouwer, Providence is not anthropocentric but soteriological. It is part of God’s gracious, redemptive care. Being soteriological, it is also theocentric, for it is rooted in God’s grace, and it elicits praise. God “serves” man with the result that man praises and worships Him. Furthermore, it is only the Christian who can know this Providence as loving, Fatherly care.
The question that this writer would ask is this: How is it that Providence can be thought of as soteriological in nature in its widest sense, that is, as it involves the care and rule of all men, believers and non-believers alike? What is in it for the non-Christian?
Berkouwer’s answer to this query lies in his chapter on sustenance. He puts it this way: “Why does God continue to sustain and prolong the world? The reason for Berkouwer is soteriological. God continues to sustain the world, and continues to suffer long for the world, in order that there might be time for the message of His grace to be proclaimed. Continued history is thus serious, for it is a time of God’s call to repentance. The continuation of the world is a call to preach. In this sense, Providence can be seen as soteriological even when considered in relation to the non-believer.
The concept of Providence as sustenance has been introduced and will now be dealt with in detail. The distinction between Providence as sustenance and Providence as government is found in most systematic theologies. The latter phrase is used to mean “the purpose or end to which God leads all things,” and the former, “the preservation, upholding, and maintenance” of creation. Berkouwer follows the traditional pattern in separating the two, while affirming their interdependence. Although Calvin does not deal with each separately, he certainly establishes the distinction: “But faith ought to penetrate more deeply, namely, having found Him Creator of all, forthwith to conclude that He is also everlasting Governor and Preserver” (16:1).
Both Calvin and Berkouwer are careful to establish the necessity of God’s sustaining hand upon all things. The very fact that things continue to exist is due to God’s preserving activity. Although Scripture clearly distinguishes between Creation and Sustenance, God’s power is equally displayed in both. Apart from understanding God’s preservation of His creation, it is not possible to comprehend what it means to say that “God is Creator” (16.1). Berkouwer is particularly strong in asserting that there is no self-containment, autonomy, or out-right independence in any created thing. In doing so he attacks the metaphysical notion of substance as something which exists in itself. There are neither self-sustaining substances nor self-existing creatures. He cites the great “upholding and holding together” passages which point to the utter dependence of all things upon the Word.
Calvin, while not addressing such a metaphysical concept directly as such, does nevertheless touch on the matter. Inanimate objects do not exercise power of their own apart from direction by God’s “ever present” hand. Even the sun is not necessary for the maintenance of life since God could just as well act through Himself, as He did before the creation of the sun. Calvin is keenly concerned that God not be seen as idle – sitting back, quite detached from a world which He has simply set running on its course. No, in God’s omnipotence, He is active, ever watchful, engaged in ceaseless activity. Nothing exists apart from His activity. The relation of this “ceaseless activity” to natural causation will be examined in the next section.
Berkouwer’ s soteriological understanding of the continued preservation of the world has already been mentioned. There is another view of the continuation of history, what might be called the supralapsarian view, against which Berkouwer strongly speaks. In this view, the prolongation of history has no basis in God’s grace; rather, it is neutral, providing a graceless “substrata” for the working out of God’s eternally fixed decree. “There is no serious invitation of salvation to all men” (p. 75). There is no longsuffering, but rather a forestalling of doom. For the non-elect, pure wrath is the only possibility. There can be no real decisions.
In this view, history has meaning only as a substratum for the working out of the eternally decreed ends of history. It is a basis for which these decrees can mature – in two directions – salvation or damnation. For the reprobate, there is no grace in sustenance, only the possibility of damnation.
For Berkouwer, this “systematic deduction from the eternal decree of God” creates a “tension and contradiction between the hidden, decretive will and the revealed will of God” in which the revealed will loses its significance (p. 76). Here is Berkouwer’s contempt for speculative schematization. For in directing attention to the two-track view of history, the message of Scripture is ignored. The words of God in time are glossed over, and historical revelation is thus devalued. Is this two-track view of history in any sense a central message of Scripture? No. Revelation focuses on God’s redemption of a lost world.
Is Calvin guilty of this type of schematization? He certainly puts emphasis on God’s eternal decree, even in his discussion of Providence. He speaks of God, who “in accordance with his wisdom has from the farthest limit of eternity decreed what he was going to do” (16:8). Examination of Calvin’s teaching on election in Book 2, Chapter 21 ff. also secure the fact that God’s decrees were established before the fall, and, that there is in his thinking a kind of two-track view of history. However, several things must be said which would separate Calvin from the more severe supralapsarian views which came after him. First, Calvin’s insistence on the fixed nature of God’s decree is meant to establish, as Scripture does, that God does in fact rule in all things. Second, Calvin’s detailed treatment of election comes not prior to the discussion of creation or the fall, but in Book Three, after his teaching on justification, the atonement, etc. In other words, it finds its place where it comes as an encouragement to the believer, with the further purpose of establishing in no uncertain terms that the free gift of salvation is utterly separate from human merit. Third, Calvin constantly was against speculation on the matter, emphasizing that whatever be known about election and the Divine decrees is to be sought in scripture only. From these points, in the placement of the doctrine of election in Book Three, and in the warning against speculation, it can be concluded that Calvin did not see the Divine decrees as a theological starting point from which all other doctrines must proceed. Rather, election is seen as yet another aspect of the grace of God. Thus Calvin is not involved in the kind of schematization which Berkouwer rails against, even if it might be true (this writer has not made a final judgment here) that Calvin’s views could be said, in terms of context, to be supralapsarian.
It is clear from this discussion that Providence as sustenance and Providence as government are closely intertwined concepts. The very fact that God continues to sustain shows that He has a purpose in so sustaining. Providence as government speaks of God’s omnipotent purposeful rule over all things. In his organization of the issues within God’s Providence, Calvin does not separate government from sustenance, although most of what he says does indeed have reference to God’s purposeful direction of all creatures. For Calvin, there is simply nothing at all which takes place apart from God’s purposeful determination:
We do not with the stoics, contrive a necessity out of the perpetual connection and intimately related series of causes, which is contained in nature; but we make God the ruler and governor of all things, who in accordance with His wisdom has from the furthest limit of eternity decreed what he was going to do, and now by his might carries out what he has decreed. From this we declare that not only heaven and earth and the inanimate creatures, but also the plans and intentions of men, are so governed by his Providence that they are born by it straight to their appointed end (16.8).
Among other things here, Calvin is arguing against a necessity arising from secondary causation in nature. Such a blind nature-bound causation would give rise to what is termed fate or fortune. God may employ natural means, but it is He who sustains all natural means, who also rules over, directs, and causes events to proceed to their established end. In eliminating secondary causation as an independent determining factor in human life and events, Calvin is not thereby giving up the concept of secondary means, or what he terms independent causes. These intermediate means are to be taken up and taken advantage of by the responsible, prudent believer, as he cares for himself and for others. God’s determined plan does not preclude our responsible action. We are not, for example, to let natural causes proceed, say in the case of disease, without intervening. Our responsible intervention comes within God’s wise rule.
Calvin’ s point is that behind all events, which may on a human level appear natural, blind, or fortuitous is the deeply hidden “first cause,” which is God’s secret Providence. Here Calvin calls up Augustine, who said, “… for perhaps what is commonly called fortune is also ruled by a secret order” (16.8). To Augustine, it is absurd to think of a thing happening apart from God’s ordaining it, for then it would happen without a cause. Again, there is no independent cause and effect continuum in nature. What for us appears as a necessity arising out of the peculiar nature of a thing is not in fact a necessity. God’s ordination and active ruling of an event is the event’s cause. “God’s will is the highest and first cause of all things, for nothing can happen apart from God’s command or permission” (16:8).
Only “what God has determined must necessarily take place” (16:9). Calvin distinguishes thus between relative necessity (what seems to arise out of the nature of a thing) and unconditional necessity which is rooted in God’s determination. For Berkouwer, this line of thought is highly problematic. He argues that the reformer’s concept of such an exclusively-active God showed a disrespect for second causes. Granted, Berkouwer was particularly piqued by those who would “schematize” on the basis of causality, a complaint which may not apply methodologically to Calvin. One who so schematizes, says Berkouwer, “immediately begins to grope in darkness, and creates an insoluble problem in the doctrine of sin” (p. 157). Or, in another place, he says, “We cannot explain the sequences of history with an all-encompassing system of causation.” Yet, in Calvin is not found a “system” of mere causation within which is included God as first cause. This lowering of God into the system of causation is strongly opposed by Berkouwer. But God is not part of a “scheme” in Calvin’s thinking either. Referring to God as first cause is merely his way of affirming that all things happen or exist as a result of God’s sovereign control of all events. There is God who decrees and acts and who is personally involved.
Calvin writes: “What God has determined must necessarily take place” (16.9). In contrast to this, Berkouwer offers an impassionate polemic against all forms of determinism, a concept which he sees as having its basis in the idea of an all-governing causality. He protests against “speculative systems” of determinist causality which, in his mind pronounce man morally guiltless by denying his volitional freedom (p. 145), and God to blame for human sin. If man acts out of absolute necessity, can be held responsible for his acts. Berkouwer repeats this concept of absolute necessity and following Luther, distinguishes between blind coercion on the one hand, and the fact simply that something must occur on the other hand (p. 149). This latter concept he embraces as one which both safeguards God’s absolute rule over all events and man’s responsibility for his actions. “The Reformed confession of Providence does not reason from the idea of causation. It simply recognizes the invincibility of God’s sovereign activity” (p. 152). It is difficult to judge whether Calvin, when he uses the phrase “God determines all things,” has in mind the same meaning of determinism that Berkouwer does. As has been shown, Calvin does not seem to have in mind a rigid cause-causing-caused scheme as much as an affirmation of God’s total sovereign control. Yet this is an extremely active engaged type of control. For Berkouwer, logically, such a scheme would preclude human responsibility. He seems to be falling in to the trap he accuses others of in refusing to accept an assertion because of what might be the assertion’s logical consequences, in this case in order to protect human responsibility, which is a spiritual given.
For Calvin, the fact that events are caused, determined, and done “of necessity” does not render men guiltless. Even sinful acts are done by God’s secret decree, act, and determination. Yet, man, acted upon by God, nevertheless himself acts:
We ought, indeed to hold fast by this; while God accomplishes through the wicked what he has decreed by His secret judgment, they are not excusable, as if they had obeyed his precept which out of their own lust they deliberately break (18.4).
Berkouwer’s book begins with a summary of the crisis of the Providence doctrine, and his last chapter addresses this problem head on. The problem which arises as the crisis of Providence is the problem of theodicy – the justification of God’s providential rule. “Theodicy is an attempt to defend God against all complaints or accusations by demonstrating the meaningfulness and purposefulness of God’s activity in the world and in human life” (p.232). In dealing with this problem of theodicy Berkouwer pulls out all the stops in his polemic against rationalistic speculation. Despite the naturalness or understandableness of theodicy (in light of real men having to live through severe crises, depression, and extraordinary events), theodicy is nevertheless an attempt to “justify God at the judgment seat of reason” (p. 233). Can and should a rational theodicy – a natural theodicy – prove to be just and good? Berkouwer lays out the five theodicy models, one of which is Barth’s Christological Theodicy, which Barth himself did not refer to as a theodicy per se. Common to all these theodicies is a certain method. “In Theodicy,” writes Berkouwer, “the attributes of God are usually confronted with the experimental realities of sin, suffering, and death” (p. 245). One proceeds then from these facts of experience through reasoned argument to a demonstration of God’s justice. This, however, is a repudiation of Divine revelation, which declares a priori that God is righteous. Reality itself can only be understood by revelation. God’s righteousness is by no means to be construed as a deduction of human reason. Besides, the natural theodicies do not work anyway – God is not in fact vindicated and reality is not better understood. Modern man chooses nihilism rather than submit to the false harmonies of the various theodicies.
Calvin from start to finish works from the stand point of Scriptural a priori’s – e.g., God’s holiness, good men, omnipotence, and man’s responsibility. One who would weigh God’s Providence correctly “must consider that his business is with his Maker and the framer of the universe, submitting humbly in fear and reverence (18.4). But this is not a “God as a bully” approach. God is good, just, loving, and kind. This, as Berkouwer agrees, has been shown in and through Jesus Christ.
There are limits to our knowledge, both Calvin and Berkouwer would agree, which form a line drawn between us and God in His incomprehensibility, but in respecting their limits we can have genuine peace and trust. All through its history, notes Berkouwer, Israel has praised God even, yes – especially in times of great crisis and trauma. They have praised him in His judgment which is holy, and his holiness which is just. Doxology, which characterizes the Biblical approach of both Calvin and Berkouwer, is the perspective with which to wonder, in times of honesty, why?
Bibliography
Berkouwer, G.C. The Providence of God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion Vol I., from The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 20., Ed., by John T. McNeill. Trans. Ford Lewis Battles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.
|
 |
|
 |
|
||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
||||
